

Organizing against Globalization: The Case of ATTAC in France

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This article argues that the current opposition to globalization is not a structural side effect of economic integration. Instead of assuming that globalization generates resistance, it stresses the political and interpretive processes that shape collective action. It substantiates this claim by studying the rise of an antiglobalization social movement organization called ATTAC in France. It holds that ATTAC's emergence is the product of political entrepreneurs whose actions were constrained by the ideational and organizational legacies of previous contentious episodes, particularly the December 1995 strikes. Finally, it contends that ATTAC's success stems in part from its ability to produce a hybrid discourse that marries state interventionism with participatory politics.

An increasing number of people around the world are organizing against globalization, that is, “a set of changes in the international economy that tend to produce a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor.”¹ Some commentators even claim that the issue of globalization threatens “to divide world opinion as nothing has since the collapse of Communism.”² However, we still know very little about this new wave of mass mobilization.

There are different ways of addressing this issue. One can claim, for example, that the protests against globalization are a backlash against the increasing influence of foreign cultures, particularly American culture, and the values they convey.³ However, most social scientists and activists writing on globalization

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assume that this opposition is basically the product of economic and structural change. Thus, authors drawing on neoclassical trade models—such as the Hecksher-Ohlin or the Ricardo-Viner models—or Marxist theory contend that this opposition is driven by a defense of economic interests, whether defined in sector or class terms, while others, drawing on Karl Polanyi's countermovement theory, contend that the protests against globalization embody the self-protection of society against its dislocation as market forces expand.⁴ According to these economic and structural arguments, it is globalization itself that produces or generates protests and resistance.

For example, in their study of the Seattle anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protests of December 1999, Mark Lichbach and Paul Almeida claim that the deepening of economic integration and interdependence creates new cleavages and leads to redistributive conflicts, zero-sum struggles, polarization, and eventually to "local resistance to the global order." Furthermore, "the new institutions of global governance that are being created to manage the global economy are altering local-national-regional-international linkages and thereby generating new conflicts over the new rules."⁵

This type of argument can shed some light on the politics of globalization, above all if it integrates intervening institutional variables, and some of its predictions may be accurate. However, even in countries where discontent is widespread, economic and structural explanations cannot account for the magnitude, form, constituency, and ideology of the opposition to globalization. First, any causal relationship between globalization and collective action is difficult to specify in analytical terms because the concept of globalization is generally vague and ambiguous.⁶ Second, even when defined in strict economic terms, the impact of globalization is far from self-evident. We need thus to distinguish the sources of collective action from its form, discourse, and goal. It is not because some actors frame their claims in terms of globalization that the latter is the actual cause of collective action. As Sidney Tarrow points out, "Concrete actors with domestic political agendas draw on the symbols of globalization but are not determined by it."⁷

Therefore, to account for the growing opposition to globalization, I propose to stress the role of politics and adopt a dynamic perspective focusing on strategic interactions and processes. A rapidly developing literature on transnational politics adopts such a dynamic perspective and provides some insights on emerging forms of collective action that parallel globalization.⁸ Nonetheless, rather than trying to explain collective action across borders (i.e., the globalization of contention) as the transnational politics literature does, I want to account for political responses to globalization. As I will explain, these responses remain primarily embedded in national politics. Furthermore, the transnational politics literature has so far focused on the international political opportunity structure and transnational networks but has paid little attention to framing activities and, more generally, interpretive processes. These collective interpretive processes play an impor-

tant role in explaining the dynamics of contemporary contentious politics because it is through them that actors make sense of long-term structural changes such as globalization.⁹

Put in general terms, I will argue that the opposition to globalization cannot be reduced to a structural side effect or a spontaneous countermovement. It is the result of a political and cultural process conditioned by previous contentious episodes and struggles. I will substantiate my claim by looking at antiglobalization politics in France, a country perhaps more divided by globalization than any other advanced industrialized country.¹⁰ Specifically, I will analyze a new organization whose sole purpose is to oppose globalization: the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC). Founded in 1998, this organization has become one of the leaders of the struggle against globalization in France. It already counts almost thirty thousand members and forty sister organizations throughout the world, it is courted by mainstream political parties in anticipation of local and national elections, and it has managed to turn the Tobin Tax from an esoteric economic proposition into a widely discussed issue enjoying strong public support: in September 2001, 71 percent of the French were in favor of the implementation of such a tax.¹¹

In this article, I will analyze the emergence, discourse, and strategy of ATTAC at the crossroads of dense organizational networks and its roots in the wake of several social conflicts, particularly the December 1995 strikes. I will contend that during the 1990s, the political process brought about the development of a new interpretive frame that I call the “Politics against Global Markets” frame. I will argue that this frame became a sort of discursive paradigm that shaped the emergence and content of subsequent claims and demands of social and political actors. It is in this context that ATTAC formulated a discourse that I call “associational statism.” This discourse lies at the crossroads of several political traditions, acting as a bridge between the Old Left and the New Left and trying to develop a post-Marxist alternative to liberalism. Instead of blaming excessive statism for socioeconomic problems, like the New Left and neoliberals, it blames globalization. It denounces the inequality brought about by the market, like the Old Left, but eschews any class analysis. It demands state intervention, like the Old Left, but insists on civic participation at the local level, like the New Left. In this sense, ATTAC may be the harbinger of a renewal of the Left and of a reconfiguration of the French political landscape.

CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION IN FRANCE

The extent of the suspicion toward globalization in France is somewhat puzzling considering that this country has enjoyed a trade surplus since 1993 and is today the fourth largest exporting country in the world. Similarly, until the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that shook the world, the growth rate was increasing while the unemployment rate, after a decade in the double digits, had recently

gone down to 9 percent. One might have thus expected a decrease in opposition to globalization. The discrepancy between, on one hand, France's economic performance and, on the other hand, its position in international trade negotiations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) even led Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow to declare that France was a "psychiatric case."¹² Furthermore, the Socialist Party's acceptance of market mechanisms and the gradual reform of the *dirigiste* state that followed the U-turn of President Mitterrand in 1983 had led several commentators to announce the triumph of liberalism and the end of French exceptionalism.¹³

Recent polls on globalization and state intervention show the divisions and contradictions of French public opinion. In 1999, 60 percent of the French thought that globalization deepened social inequalities while 57 percent considered that it fostered economic growth.¹⁴ In 2000, 74 percent believed that free trade was a positive thing while 53 percent had a negative opinion of capitalism and 40 percent thought that globalization was a negative phenomenon. Similarly, 60 percent had a positive opinion of economic flexibility whereas at the same time 49 percent declared that planning was a good thing.¹⁵ Moreover, 62 percent of those who defined themselves as being on the Right and 63 percent of those who defined themselves as being on the Left believed that the economy was not regulated enough. Regulation was said to be needed in respect to the environment (79 percent), food safety (71 percent), workers' rights (61 percent), financial markets (55 percent), and international trade (51 percent).¹⁶ The contrast with American polls is revealing. According to Eddy Fougier, while in the United States globalization is primarily perceived as a phenomenon involving trade issues, most of the French relate it to financial (capital mobility and corporate governance) and cultural issues. Not surprisingly, most Americans take the market for granted and are often suspicious of government interventionism, while most French people expect and rely on state interventionism.¹⁷ These particularities entail not only different understandings of globalization but also different solutions to its alleged consequences.

A wide range of French organizations are hostile to globalization. It is even possible to talk of an incipient antiglobalization social movement encompassing a great variety of issues—from the crisis of the welfare state and labor conditions to the environment and genetically modified organisms—and capable of sustained interactions with the state and occasionally supranational institutions like the European Union, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.¹⁸ This movement also includes some political parties at its margins, such as the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), the Greens, the Communist Party (PC), the neo-Republican Citizens' Movement, and sectors of the Socialist Party (PS).¹⁹ Some parties on the Right, such as the National Front and the Rally for France, also criticize globalization. Thus, ATTAC is not a

self-contained phenomenon. Debates and protests started before its creation and go well beyond it.

Beyond the obvious diversity of demands and perspectives, opponents of globalization converge in their reassertion of the role of the state and of individuals as citizens rather than simply consumers. As Suzanne Berger points out, “Because the problems appear to have political origins, they appear reversible by government action. Thus, one paradoxical outcome of globalization may be to refocus political attention on the role of the state and on the boundaries of national territory.”²⁰ Moreover, in contrast to traditional protectionism that demands higher barriers to protect the economic interests of domestic producers against foreign imports, most opponents of globalization do not so much invoke specific societal and sectoral interests as they claim to be defending the nation as a whole, even humankind.²¹ This shift is not proper to France. It is partly related to the inclusion of an increasing number of sectors and human activities in international trade negotiations and to the growing importance of national regulations in determining international competitiveness. What is at stake for most opponents of globalization, including ATTAC, is not simply jobs and north-south relations but also labor conditions, social and environmental norms, food quality, and so forth, that is, national regulatory standards. They stress that the citizens’ ability to influence the definition of these standards is one of the attributes of democracy and that the state’s capability to determine and enforce them is one of the attributes of sovereignty. Thus, they see and frame their struggle as a defense of democracy, government accountability, and popular sovereignty.

This recasting of protectionism—a term that opponents of globalization generally do not use—makes, in turn, new coalitions possible between actors that did not work together in the past, such as, for example, unions and environmentalists, and between countries. Such a recasting is a gradual process that does not simply stem from the evolution of trade and long-term structural changes. As Doug McAdam and William Sewell underscore, “Strategic framing implies adherence to a nonroutine and conflictual definition of the situation. But this definition is itself a product of earlier processes of collective interpretation and social construction.”²²

Therefore, to understand an organization such as ATTAC, one needs to examine first the emergence of globalization as a contentious issue in French politics during the 1990s. The 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty brought about the first major public debate on globalization in France. As Sophie Meunier remarks, “Even if the culprit blamed then was not called globalization but Europeanization, the reasons for discontent were the same.”²³ Only a 51 percent majority approved the treaty. Both the country and mainstream political parties, particularly the conservative Gaullist party Rally for the Republic (RPR), were deeply divided. The Maastricht Treaty also put the idea of *pensée unique* (single/uniform thought)—referring to the hegemony of neoliberalism—at the center

of public debates over public policy. The fight against *la pensée unique* was thus one of the main themes of the 1995 presidential election. The winning RPR candidate Jacques Chirac called for renewed state intervention in the name of the Republican pact and to heal the “*fracture sociale*” (social divide).

Later that year, France experienced the biggest mass mobilization since the events of May 1968. Indeed, the strikes of December 1995 against RPR prime minister Alain Juppé’s plan to reform social security and in defense of public services, social protection, and the welfare state paralyzed the country for three weeks.²⁴ Led primarily by public employees (particularly from the rail public company, SNCF, but also from telecommunications, postal service, and education) and students, the strikes enjoyed the support of wide sectors of French society, including workers in the private sector.²⁵ In addition to unions and students, women’s groups and civic associations for the unemployed and the homeless also joined in. However, unions were greatly divided, as the Confédération générale du travail (CGT, close to the PC) launched the movement with the support of civic associations while the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT, close to the PS) refused to reject Juppé’s plan. These strikes reproduced a cleavage similar in many respects to the one in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. After several weeks of conflict, Juppé withdrew his reform. These strikes appeared for many people as evidence that globalization was not inevitable and that politics was still relevant. They fed the belief that ordinary people can have an effect on the course of things and in doing so, fostered participation in future mobilizations and campaigns. Moreover, the strikes brought closer together a wide range of organizations critical of the liberal turn of the PS. This informal coalition came to be called “the” social movement and the “Left of the Left” or the “Leftist Left” (“*Gauche de la gauche*” or “*Gauche de gauche*”) by the media and activists. Several of these organizations later participated in the creation of ATTAC. Interestingly enough, the inclusive and vague label “the” social movement suggests that there is a single social movement. “The” social movement seems thus to have replaced the labor movement (*le mouvement ouvrier*) as the vanguard in the political imaginary of some sectors of the Left.

The Politics against Global Markets Frame

The 1995 strikes were both a protest against globalization and against Juppé’s political style—he did not consult unions and tried to impose his reform from above, in the *dirigiste* tradition. Regardless of the actual causes of this event, what matters for the purpose of this article is that a new interpretive frame arose out of this contentious episode. Collective action frames do not entail a consensus or support for specific policies, and they are not as elaborated, encompassing, and coherent as ideologies. They are an interpretive schemata that simplifies events and experiences, redefines situations as unjust, and connects several distinct grievances.²⁶ To be effective and turn passivity into action, they must be different

Table 1
The Politics against Global Markets Frame

| Sphere | Politics | Global Markets |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Normative ideals | Common good, equality, solidarity | Individualism, profit, performance, efficiency |
| Organizing principles | Citizenship, rights, participation, representation, accountability, sovereignty | Competition, flexibility, disembeddedness, anarchy |
| Implications | Empowerment, social redistribution, cultural diversity, democracy | Powerlessness, inequality (between and within countries), atomism, rootlessness, commodification, cultural homogenization, tyranny |
| Agents | States, political parties, civic associations, social movements, international nongovernmental organizations, citizenry | Transnational corporations, international financial institutions, governments and elites who have surrendered to globalization, shareholders, consumers |

from the dominant, conventional discourse that fosters compliance. They must be adversarial and action oriented. They must transform a given phenomenon into a social problem, attribute the responsibility for it to someone, and possibly propose general solutions and strategies.

I call the new collective action frame that arose out the 1995 strikes the Politics against Global Markets frame (see Table 1). This frame opposes virtuous and democratic civic politics to corrupt antidemocratic market forces. It puts forward a Manichean vision of social reality, with civic politics being defined as quintessentially good while markets are a realm governed by the law of the jungle, where individualistic and immoral aspirations prevail at the expense of the common good. It follows that, for ordinary individuals, politics is the realm of empowerment while markets are realms of powerlessness. The state appears then as the privileged resort of civilization against anarchy, that is, the war of all against all.²⁷ It stands as the guarantor of rights and equality against the inequality inevitably stemming from the logic of the market and as the rampart of national cultures against homogenization. It is important to bear in mind that the divide underlying this frame is “politics against markets,” not one nation against another, as nationalists and Gaullists would put it, or workers against capitalists, as Marxists would put it. Furthermore, the markets that are blamed are no longer simply national. They are global and, therefore, even meaner than national ones because they are beyond the reach of the nation-state and thereby more difficult to tame. These shifts from nation or class to politics and markets, and from the national to the global, also entail that the actors concerned are no longer the same ones.

Although international issues were already part of domestic politics before globalization became a buzzword, they were couched in different terms. The relative originality of the Politics against Global Markets frame is easier to grasp

when one compares it to the frame of the anti-IMF/World Bank campaign of the 1980s. As Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht show in their study of the protests that took place in West Berlin in September 1988, this campaign addressed north-south relations, the Third World debt, the destruction of cultural identities, unemployment, and reductions in social welfare in developed countries; blamed the capitalist character of the world economic order and the role of the IMF and the World Bank; and called for a reformation of that order.²⁸ Today's antiglobalization protests are driven by similar issues and normative ideals. However, this frame differs from the Politics against Global Markets frame in the way it ties the problems together; in its lack of attention to the democratic deficit, the role of the state, and the national/global articulation; and in its omission of the identity of citizen as a symbol antonymous to the world of global finance.

This evolution may be related to major international changes, such as the collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war, that gave a new dimension to democracy and citizenship. Nonetheless, the Politics against Global Markets frame is neither the mechanical product of structural conditions nor the expression of a spontaneous countermovement or a simple derivative of the French statist, antiliberal political culture, although the latter is certainly a constraining factor that shapes the production and reception of new symbols.²⁹ Workers and students did not begin to mobilize and protest with a clear, shared frame in mind. As Sidney Tarrow puts it, "It is in struggle that people discover which values they share, as well as what divides them, and learn to frame their appeals around the former and paper over the latter."³⁰ Collective action frames are strategically constructed and articulated, under certain material, institutional, and cultural constraints, by political agents. The Politics against Global Markets frame did not clearly emerge until the second or even third week of the strike, when several renowned intellectuals and activists signed a well-publicized petition in support of the strikes. This petition was itself a reaction to a previous petition published in defense of Juppé's reform.³¹ The government itself and its supporters also fuelled the subsequent emphasis on globalization by justifying Juppé's reform in the name of pragmatism in the face of inevitable external constraints imposed by globalization. The media picked up this simple picture, and on 7 December 1995, *Le Monde* called the strikes "the first upheaval against globalization."

It is therefore crucial to place strategic interactions at the center of the framing process. The Politics against Global Markets frame is the outcome rather than the cause of the 1995 strikes. Its configuration came into being during this contentious episode and only later became institutionalized in everyday public discourse and picked up by other groups for different purposes. Having said that, new frames are not invented out of whole cloth. They draw on familiar values, categories, and symbols, and this familiarity allows them to resonate among the targeted public. In this sense, "what gives a collective action frame its novelty is not so much its innovative ideational elements as the manner in which activists articulate

or tie them together.”³² In France, the Politics against Global Markets frame invokes widely shared norms such as social equality, solidarity, and the common good, familiar categories such as market and citizen, and mobilizes strong symbols such as the public service, the social entitlements of the republic, and the threat of tyranny.³³ It avoids old themes of the Left, such as the class struggle, and stresses the inclusive identity of citizen, thereby widening its appeal. Moreover, its insistence on the interventionist role of the state is congruent with the republican statist political culture and thus does not require any justification.³⁴ In countries where the critique of the market was not shaped as much by statism and Marxism and where the reform of the public sector did not crystallize fears about globalization as in France in 1995, this frame will probably not resonate so strongly, and one can expect opponents of globalization to rely on a slightly different collective action frame.

The Politics against Global Markets frame derives its popularity not only from its cultural resonance but also from its frame-bridging capacity and its location at the intersection of many concerns, particularly those of nationalists who fear for national identity and sovereignty, those of opponents of neoliberalism who worry about inequality and the erosion of the welfare state, and those of environmentalists.³⁵ Sometimes, these concerns converge, for example, when the role of the state in the economy is presented as a distinctive feature of French national identity. The defense of the welfare state becomes then a defense of French national identity and vice versa. The possibility of extending the Politics against Global Markets frame to a multitude of problems and connecting them to each other widens its potential audience and fosters its mobilization capacity. Moreover, this frame provides a convenient way to criticize free markets and capitalism without having to rely on a Marxist vocabulary and framework. It also allows unions to defend their interests without necessarily being accused of undermining the general interest dear to the republican political culture. Thus, the Politics against Global Markets frame allows actors to avoid two stigmatizing charges in contemporary France: that of being archaic (Marxism) and corporatist.³⁶

The diffusion of this frame after the 1995 strikes is apparent in the commercial success of a number of essays denouncing the alleged evils of globalization. The most noticeable case is undoubtedly Viviane Forrester’s *The Economic Horror*. Published in 1996, it sold 300,000 copies and was translated in eighteen languages.³⁷ The Politics against Global Markets frame also structured the discourse of opponents of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1997 and 1998. Negotiated within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the MAI aimed at providing a comprehensive framework for international investment. Several provisions of the MAI challenged social and cultural national regulations and, according to MAI opponents, would have given corporations the sovereign power to govern countries.³⁸ A coalition made of unions from the entertainment sector, the civic associations and unions of “the”

social movement, the Greens, the peasant union *Confédération paysanne*, and think-tanks like the Observatory of Globalization, managed to bring the French government to withdraw from the negotiations, thereby provoking the collapse of the agreement.³⁹ Their reliance on the Politics against Global Markets frame is obvious, for example, in the “Call of 10 February 1998,” made by unions of the movie industry: “[The MAI] is leading us to a real change of civilization. We are going from the right of peoples to self-determination to the right of investors to dispose of peoples.”⁴⁰ Similarly, the “Manifesto of 28 April 1998” of the Coordination against the MAI invoked the French and the universal human rights declarations to denounce the antidemocratic character of neoliberal globalization.⁴¹

In the same vein, in late 1999, the Call for the Citizen Control of the WTO, signed by the majority of antiglobalization leaders of the Left and many celebrities, stated,

More and more every day, the market takes control of life. It organizes work, sets salaries, moves factories, decides what we drink, breathe, or eat. It cuts down on social progress, eliminates differences, destroys public services, annihilates democracy and peoples’ right to self-determination. More and more every day, globalization accelerates without any democratic institution ever deciding it. . . . More and more every day, freedom is annihilated in the name of free trade.⁴²

On 27 November of that same year, around ten thousand people marched in Paris from the Stock Exchange to Bastille, a symbol of the French Revolution and popular sovereignty, to denounce the meeting of the WTO in Seattle.

THE CREATION OF ATTAC

It is in this context of mobilization, ideational innovation, and coalition building that ATTAC emerged. Its creation in June 1998, in the midst of the mobilization against the MAI, took place in a very crowded terrain. There were already many organizations denouncing the evils of globalization. Competition between these organizations could have left little room for new actors. ATTAC, however, managed to rally most of them, at first, behind a specific demand (the Tobin Tax) and then to institutionalize the informal ties and networks relating them to one another. The presence of “initiator” movements and the role of political entrepreneurs were key factors.

Initiator movements set in motion or signal cycles of protest and have a culturally catalytic effect on later struggles.⁴³ The December 1995 strikes that brought about the crystallization of the Politics against Global Markets frame could qualify as such an initiator movement. Although it was not as influential, the movement against social exclusion also played the role of initiator. For example, several associations defending housing rights and the unemployed emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s and later supported the 1995 strikes and the mobiliza-

tion against the MAI in 1998.⁴⁴ They also progressively framed their grievances in terms consistent with the Politics against Global Markets frame.⁴⁵ In doing so, they paralleled a move by the antiracist movement, the Third World solidarity movement, and AIDS advocacy groups such as Act-up to redefine citizenship in participatory terms.⁴⁶ This emphasis on participatory politics also materialized in new forms of organization such as the “coordinations”—that is, spontaneous general assemblies rejecting political and union delegative practices and privileging direct democracy—that emerged out of the student movement and several strikes in the public sector in 1986 to 1988.⁴⁷ Similarly, the organizations fighting against social exclusion were structured around horizontal, decentralized networks. Together with the new, more radical unions (the Solidaires, unitaires, démocratiques [SUD], and the Fédération syndicale unitaire) that broke away from traditional labor federations (the CFDT and the Fédération de l'éducation nationale) in the late 1980s, the movement against social exclusion constituted dense networks and connective structures that fostered the diffusion of ideational, organizational, and tactical tools. Although distinct from one another, they were fighting on related issues and they all subsequently participated in the creation of ATTAC.

These developments contributed to the repertoire of collective action available to actors. Repertoires are familiar modes of organizing and acting to which people turn, even though “in principle some unfamiliar form of action would serve their interests much better.”⁴⁸ As Christophe Aguiton—a member of the LCR who participated in the foundation of the union SUD, the organization for the unemployed Agir ensemble contre le chômage! (AC!) and ATTAC—explains,

The emergence of all these new movements during the 1990s allowed us to accumulate a great deal of experience and capital. . . . When new issues like the Asian financial crisis appeared, we relied on what we knew. These movements of the 1990s are our toolkit.⁴⁹

Thus, the emergence of ATTAC depended on the development of other organizations. In this sense, ATTAC qualifies as a spin-off social movement organization that derives its impetus and inspiration from initiator movements and was shaped by the multiorganizational field in which it is embedded.⁵⁰

The triggering event of ATTAC's creation was a December 1997 editorial written by Ignacio Ramonet, the chief editor of *Le Monde diplomatique*, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and at the beginning of the mobilization against the MAI. Many opponents of globalization were then convinced that the Asian financial crisis was the proof that financial markets were deeply harmful and played a hegemonic role in the globalization process. Taming these markets was therefore seen as the cornerstone of any realistic plan to counter neoliberal globalization. In his editorial, after denouncing the generalized economic insecurity and the democratic deficit fostered by globalization, Ramonet suggested the creation of an organization called Action for a Tobin Tax for the Aid of Citizens. Such an organi-

zation, Ramonet argued, could collaborate with unions and associations and act as a civic pressure group demanding the implementation of the Tobin Tax.⁵¹

Ramonet apparently touched a chord, for in the following weeks, *Le Monde diplomatique* received thousands of letters from organizations and individuals willing to support such an initiative. In March 1998, several unions, civic organizations, and newspapers met and agreed on three general points: (1) a challenge to the hegemony of “ultraliberalism” requires the construction of credible alternatives; (2) the taxation of financial transactions, particularly the Tobin Tax, could contain economic insecurity and inequality; and (3) the urgency of checking the damage of financial globalization requires a civic burst transcending traditional cleavages in France and the world.⁵² On 3 June, a constitutive general assembly officially created the association, adopted a platform, and elected the first board of directors, which in turn elected Bernard Cassen, director of *Le Monde diplomatique*, as president.

A priori, the collective goods to which ATTAC aspires are remote and conducive to free riding and thus cannot by themselves constitute strong incentives to mobilize. In fact, an important part of ATTAC’s discourse is framed in terms of “collective evils,” such as massive inequalities, tyranny, society’s disintegration, and so forth, rather than collective goods.⁵³ Hence, the importance of political entrepreneurs, whose motives and attitudes are likely to be different from those of the rank and file (more principled beliefs, longer time horizon, or personal ambitions) and whose organizational skills, social capital, and symbolic resources allow them to take advantage of opportunities. In this respect, the role of *Le Monde diplomatique*, one of the leading newspapers of the French Left, cannot be overstated: it implied immediate access to intellectual resources, legitimacy, and organizational networks cutting across newspapers, parties, unions, associations, and countries, as well as the possibility of reaching an audience representing a “conscience constituency” or “sentiment pool.”⁵⁴ The experienced activists and unionists that participated in the foundation of ATTAC were aware of this advantage and seized the opportunity.

On the other hand, these activists and unionists brought with them a substantial know-how that the intellectuals gathered around *Le Monde diplomatique* did not have. What they did share, however, was a general understanding of globalization consistent with the Politics against Global Markets frame, a suspicion toward mainstream parties, a refusal of the liberal turn of the PS, and a strong attachment to what Lichbach and Almeida call “global ideals” (global justice, peace, human rights, sustainable development, etc.).⁵⁵ Political and moral incentives seem to have been crucial. Furthermore, their identification with the so-called “Left of the Left” and “the” social movement that emerged out of the 1995 strikes constituted a common ground that not only shaped their definition of the situation but also guided their tactical and organizational choices by privileging certain natural allies and modes of representation. These political entrepreneurs’ actions were

thus constrained by the ideational and organizational legacies of previous contentious episodes.

The result of this encounter between a coherent group of intellectuals and experienced organizers representing different sectors of French civil society provides selective incentives to different constituencies. These incentives are both strategic/instrumental and moral/purposive. For unions, it is a chance to reach associations and social movements and thereby widen their support network and legitimacy. For example, for Pierre Tartakowsky, ATTAC's secretary general and a member of the union CGT, the idea of creating an organization like ATTAC was appealing because the CGT had been thinking about its articulation to "the" social movement for a while:

The idea of an alliance, even in a very vague form, that would take place in the realm of the City and not necessarily in that of labor so as to question the deep trends of the liberal economy, was very interesting.⁵⁶

For civic associations, ATTAC may mean access to tangible (facilities, means of communication, etc.) and, above all, intangible (organizing and legal skills, expertise, social and symbolic capital, etc.) resources. Finally, for the rank and file, incentives seem to be primarily moral and symbolic, insofar as ATTAC represents an opportunity to express a disenchantment with institutional politics while rebuilding a sense of belonging and collective identity. This expressive dimension translated into an emphasis on grassroots politics and direct, local democracy and shaped the development of ATTAC into a decentralized mobilizing structure that its founders had not foreseen.

ATTAC'S MEMBERSHIP AND STRUCTURE

To understand the emergence and development of an organization as heterogeneous as ATTAC, it is necessary to look at its membership and organizational structure. The latter stem in part from the social and organizational networks underlying ATTAC and at the same time reinforce and expand these networks. The membership and organizational structure also shape the way ATTAC relates to other organizations.

Membership

The growth rate of ATTAC's membership is impressive, all the more considering the abstract nature and complexity of the processes it denounces. It reached almost thirty thousand members in a little more than two years. In late 2001, teachers, intellectuals, and students represented about a third of its membership, and there were 556 organizations—mostly unions and associations—that were members as legal entities (*personnes morales*).⁵⁷ In contrast to organizations with

a large but inactive base financing a few active leaders, ATTAC prides itself of a strong social base and mobilizing capacity. In the words of Christophe Ventura, international office secretary of ATTAC:

ATTAC is really not [a nongovernmental organization, or NGO]. The big difference between an NGO and us is that we are an organization with a real base. We are not a club of researchers or activists. We are a civic movement.⁵⁸

The membership of ATTAC is made of both individuals and legal entities such as unions, newspapers, and municipalities. Founder members are very diverse. They include the following:

1. trade unions, representing peasants, teachers, postal workers, lawyers, and branches of major confederations like the CGT and the CFDT;
2. civic associations, focusing on unemployment such as AC!, Association pour l'emploi, l'information et la solidarité (APEIS), and Mouvement national des chômeurs et précaires (MNCP), others defending reproductive rights, others demanding rights for marginalized populations such as the homeless and undocumented immigrants, and some defending the separation of church and state (the *laïcité*);
3. newspapers and magazines, such as *Le Monde diplomatique*, *Alternatives économiques*, *Charlie Hebdo*, and *Témoignage chrétien*; and
4. public intellectuals, such as the late René Dumont, Viviane Forrester, Susan George, Gisèle Halimi, René Passet, Ignacio Ramonet, and singer Manu Chao.⁵⁹

Several distinctive features characterize the membership of ATTAC. First, intellectuals play a central role as active rather than just symbolic members. This is reflected in the willingness to popularize abstract and complex economic issues (that is, the purpose of ATTAC's Scientific Council) and in the degree of formalism of the organizational structure from the very beginning. Second, there is a strong predominance of trade unions of the public sector, in particular teachers unions. This is surprising considering that teachers are not directly affected by the consequences of globalization, except in a very general way as any other citizen. The same could be said about lawyers. In contrast, workers in sectors directly challenged by globalization, such as the textile industry, are completely absent. In this sense, there does not seem to be a relationship between joining ATTAC and defending specific economic interests. This lack of relation to material incentives is also apparent in the membership of civic associations defending reproductive rights and the separation of church and state, or demanding an increased availability of affordable housing.

Third, the three labor confederations—CGT, CFDT, Force ouvrière (FO)—have a very low profile. This reflects ATTAC's declared willingness to construct an autonomous organization that will not be used instrumentally by big-

ger players. Not a single political party was involved in the creation of ATTAC, although some founder members were also members of political parties.

Among other significant absentees are representatives of the entertainment sector, environmentalist organizations (the only environmentalist association among founder members is Friends of the Earth), and immigrants associations. The absence of immigrants associations is surprising considering that they were very active during the 1980s and 1990s.⁶⁰ This absence is perhaps related to the immigrants' ambivalent situation with respect to globalization: on one hand, they embody the mobility of labor across borders and are, in this sense, a concrete manifestation of globalization; on the other hand, insofar as they are generally a poor and low-skilled population, they are directly affected by economic insecurity, unemployment, and cuts in social spending.⁶¹

The absence of environmentalist organizations clearly distinguishes the French antiglobalization movement from, say, its American equivalent. Several authors have noted the continued salience and conflicting character of the class cleavage in French politics and, as a result, the relatively low mobilizing capacity of so-called new social movements such as the environmentalist movement.⁶² The absence of representatives of the entertainment sector is a lot more puzzling because they regularly denounce the Americanization of French culture and were very critical of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations. Moreover, they already had ties with antiglobalization organizations insofar as they were at the center of the mobilization against the MAI in 1997 and 1998. This should have made them natural founder members of ATTAC.

Finally, ATTAC is characterized by a high level of multiple affiliations among its leaders. Many of them are also members of other organizations, generally unions. Overlapping memberships are also fostered by the participation of many organizations as legal entities within ATTAC. These multiple affiliations and overlapping memberships increase ATTAC's mobilizing capacity. They constitute bridging networks that facilitate the circulation of information and other resources and contribute to the development of mutual trust among organizations. In doing so, they consolidate alliances and foster cooperation between organizations.⁶³ The denser the networks, the higher the likelihood of cooperation. There is therefore a circular dynamic at work: at first, political entrepreneurs took advantage of these networks to create ATTAC, and, subsequently, ATTAC institutionalized them—for example, by allowing organizations to become members as legal entities—and expanded them. Thus, ATTAC played in some way the role of broker, bringing together in a stable site previously unconnected or poorly connected actors that participated in different networks. In doing so, it laid the foundations of a new political identity and changed the relational dynamics of the French Left.⁶⁴

In 2001, 125 deputies at the National Assembly were members of ATTAC and there was also an ATTAC coordination at the European parliament.⁶⁵ On one hand, these deputies have been an important external resource of ATTAC, as they regu-




Figure 1. Organization chart.

Note: B of D = board of directors; GA = general assembly.

larly relay its analysis and demand that the Tobin Tax be taken seriously. In this respect, the victory of the PS-led coalition in the June 1997 legislative elections affected the political opportunities available to social movement organizations opposed to globalization and increased their chances of shaping public deliberations.⁶⁶ On the other hand, ATTAC is haunted by the prospect of electoral manipulation and instrumentalization. This prospect is accentuated by the fact that local branches of political parties were, until recently, allowed to become members of ATTAC as legal entities. Multiple affiliations are a double-edged sword that can also jeopardize the autonomy of an organization.

Structure

ATTAC's structure is relatively formal (see Figure 1). There are written rules, fixed procedures, a division of labor, territorial units, a limited professionalization, and formal membership criteria. Such a degree of formalism helps to mobilize resources (money, information, members, etc.) and thereby challenge authorities for a more extended period of time. It is in this sense an important factor in the duration of a movement. Membership dues are the primary source of

ATTAC's funding. They are collected at the national level, and 25 percent of the total is redistributed to local committees depending on their membership level. In 1998, they represented 71.5 percent of the funding; in 1999, 50.9 percent; and in 2000, 55 percent. Most of the rest of the funding comes from donations and public subsidies.⁶⁷

In spite of its formalism, ATTAC has a decentralized and participatory structure. Local committees enjoy a relative autonomy to decide what strategies and events they want to pursue—some prefer to organize conferences and public debates, while others emphasize street demonstrations—within the bounds of the organization's general orientations. The number of local committees has increased dramatically. By early 2002, there were already 230 local committees throughout France. Such a local presence and decentralized structure favor face-to-face interactions; facilitate the building of local coalitions around specific, concrete issues; and foster an active membership. This allows ATTAC to mobilize at several levels. To some extent, this incredible development could not have been possible without the Internet. Although only about a third of ATTAC's members are connected to the Web, the Internet immediately became the "virtual" spinal cord of the organization as mailing lists were created and documents posted on a Web site before ATTAC had printed its first document on paper. Members of future local committees could have instant access to information and organize their own group. The prominent role of the Internet also shaped the future development of ATTAC by fostering the horizontal and transverse circulation of information and the building of networks.⁶⁸ Such a dynamic would have been impossible—because of obvious financial and time constraints—if the founders of ATTAC had had to rely on printed documents and traditional means of communication. In turning the Internet into a defining feature of its organizational structure, ATTAC innovated within the existing repertoire of collective action.

However, these local committees were not part of the original plan, as ATTAC was more conceived as a lobby group producing a counterexpertise. Thus, local committees are not part of ATTAC's statutes. The creation of a horizontal network of local committees was completely a bottom-up process that took the national direction by surprise and is still at the source of many internal conflicts. The rank and file care deeply about the decentralized structure and participatory politics of the organization and stress that local committees play a crucial role in providing a space for innovative ideas and practices.⁶⁹ They often emphasize these particularities to distinguish themselves from political parties and even unions. ATTAC seems indeed to benefit from the disaffection from which traditional organizations suffer. In 2000, only 20 percent of the French felt that they were well represented by a political leader, and only 16 percent felt that they were well represented by unions.⁷⁰ Insofar as an antiliberal critique of the market is not proper to ATTAC, organizational and tactical elements seem to be the cornerstone of the rank and file's political identity. As Elisabeth Clemens explains, "Organizational

forms may be a source of shared identity. . . . The answer to ‘who are we?’ need not be a quality or noun; ‘we are people who do these sorts of things in this particular way’ can be equally compelling.”⁷¹ Having said that, a “top-down” pattern still appears to predominate inside the organization. In spite of efforts to build “bottom-up” channels, such as the National Conference of Local Committees, that would make a substantial contribution to the orientation of the organization, the main decisions and the funding remain centralized in the hands of the Parisian national direction.

Finally, ATTAC also has many sister organizations abroad.⁷² By January 2002, there were forty ATTAC organizations in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Japan. This international presence is not the result of a planned strategy. According to Christophe Ventura, international office secretary of ATTAC,

The creation of ATTAC associations outside of France is a spontaneous phenomenon. Our Web site played an important role in that respect. But we did not try to develop them. They do not have any official status in our regulations and our relations with them are informal and not structured. Furthermore, they have different structures and are faced with different realities. The French model is not exportable. Each association tries to find a model adapted to its reality.⁷³

Therefore, ATTAC is not a multinational civic organization whose world headquarters would be in Paris. It suggests, however, that ideas and practices can spread quickly and lead to the emergence of relatively similar (in terms of goals and discourse) organizations in other countries.

ASSOCIATIONAL STATISM

Although widespread, the Politics against Global Markets frame does not contain a substantial analysis of globalization nor a clear set of demands. It only connects several distinct grievances, defines the situation as unjust, and blames global markets and its allies. One of ATTAC’s self-proclaimed main tasks and *raison d’être* is thus to develop a more specific discourse, an alternative and yet serious vision of the economy that will redefine the public debate while mobilizing the citizenry. As the environmentalist movement did in the 1980s, the idea is to offer a counterexpertise that will challenge neoliberalism and denaturalize its vision of the economy. The formulation of such an alternative program is conditioned by the Politics against Global Markets frame. The latter underlies the general understanding of socioeconomic issues held by French opponents of globalization and constitutes a paradigm, logically excluding or downplaying other understandings of reality but on the basis of which different issues can be emphasized and several distinct solutions and programs can be developed.⁷⁴ Therefore, it is above all the solutions put forward and their justification that distinguish from one another the

discourses deriving from the Politics against Global Markets frame. At the risk of using an oxymoron, I call ATTAC's programmatic effort "associational statism."

Diagnosis

The initial problems identified by ATTAC are not new: deepening of inequalities both between and within countries, economic insecurity, unemployment, low wages, democratic deficit, and ultimately the disintegration of societies. These problems are part of everyday politics. What is new, however, is that they are no longer presented as inherent features of capitalism, as the result of bad public policy, as temporary characteristics of an economic cycle, or as the product of a rigid and archaic interventionist state. They are now related to a new phenomenon, globalization, that ATTAC defines as the convergence of two trends: first, the restructuring of the mode of state intervention in the economy, the liberalization and opening of national markets, and the emergence of global—primarily financial—markets; second, the incorporation of an increasing share of human activities in the market.

How does globalization produce the tragic effects of which it is accused? How is the fate of, say, French postal workers related to changes in the international economy? How are the living and working conditions of a youth in Malaysia linked to capital mobility? These are key questions, for to build a case against globalization it is necessary to show that there is a causal relation between, as Luc Boltanski would say, the happiness of a malicious person and the misfortune of an innocent.⁷⁵ Indeed, a discourse of denunciation

needs to have a theory of *power*. It needs to be able to explain the way in which the action of the persecutor has affected the fate of the unfortunate, that is, to unveil causal chains. It is preferable, moreover, that this discourse establishes that this causal action is not circumstantial and that the happiness of the persecutor is the result of the suffering of the unfortunate. This theory of power needs thus to be, more precisely, a theory of *domination*.⁷⁶

ATTAC tries to lay the foundations of a macro theory of domination by insisting on the role of financial markets and multinational corporations. In a manner consistent with the Politics against Global Markets frame, the opening sentence of its platform states,

Financial globalization increases economic insecurity and social inequalities. It bypasses and belittles the choices of peoples, democratic institutions, and the sovereign states in charge of the general interest. It replaces them with strictly speculative logics expressing the sole interests of transnational corporations and financial markets. In the name of a transformation of the world presented as a fatality, citizens and their representatives see their power to decide of their destiny contested.⁷⁷

According to ATTAC, the causal chains linking the persecutor and the unfortunate are made of three processes. First, a “race to the bottom.” Because capital can now freely scour the world for the highest return, nation-states and local authorities will be forced into a frantic race to please big investors.⁷⁸ Labor standards, professional training, cultural production, public health, housing, public services, and the environment will be deeply affected and become stakes of civilization (*enjeux de civilisation*).⁷⁹ Second, a decline of sovereignty and democracy. This decline stems in part from the race to the bottom, as global markets decide which national economic policies are good and thereby violate the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty is also threatened by the construction of a supranational state led by, as ATTAC’s president Bernard Cassen puts it, the “politburo of the Liberal International”: the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the OECD, and the European Commission.⁸⁰ The erosion of sovereignty partakes in the democratic deficit insofar as it questions the authority of representatives of the citizenry. According to Cassen, there is a fundamental contradiction between the current globalization and democracy:

In the final analysis, it is democracy itself that is the prime victim of free trade and globalization. The way in which they operate actually widens the physical gap separating the centers of decision-making and those affected by those same decisions. . . . Alienation in the extreme. Taking responsibility and being obliged to be accountable are the touchstones of democracy. On the assumption that it is their intention to work for the good of all their fellow citizens, what happens when elected representatives and governments are less and less in control of the real decision-makers, who have no real link with their territory, that is to say the financial markets and the vast conglomerates? There is no need to seek further the main factor in the disintegration of societies.⁸¹

Finally, the third process is the commodification of living organisms. For ATTAC, the privatization of agronomic and biotechnological research and the concentration of firms in the seed industry constitute a real “hold-up of the living” (*hold-up sur le vivant*) in the name of progress and competitiveness.⁸² It substitutes a logic of profit and efficiency for the common good and in doing so threatens the ecological milieu and deprives people of something to which they are entitled. Life, the respect of biodiversity, jobs in agriculture, and freedom are presented as the main victims of the “death-driven political economy” (*économie politique mortifère*) and “biototalitarianism” of multinational corporations and their allies.⁸³

These three processes show that ATTAC draws a clear causal link between local and national problems, on one hand, and changes in the international economy, on the other. Globalization is depicted as being essentially an exogenous shock: democracy, sovereignty, the welfare state model, and social and environmental norms are under assault from something that is foreign to them. In line with the Politics against Global Markets frame, the culprits are financial markets, rootless multinational corporations, and their allies, that is, international financial institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank, etc.) and governments that have surren-

dered to the logic of globalization. Globalization is thus denaturalized and understood as a threatening contingent political project rather than an inevitable and irreversible process. This emphasis on contingency suggests that international institutions are not inherently bad—or at least, not all of them—and can in principle be reformed. It is also worth pointing out that, although Cassen has written several articles criticizing Americanization and the hegemony of the English language, ATTAC pays little attention to cultural issues. Its 2002 Manifesto barely mentions—although in a positive light—the protectionist policy of “cultural exception.”

Furthermore, in contrast to traditional Leftist arguments, social classes are surprisingly absent from ATTAC’s discourse (this is all the more surprising considering that several of its leaders come from the far Left and the PC). There is no reference to the labor or working-class movement (*mouvement ouvrier*), and even old-fashioned “capitalism” is barely mentioned. The new privileged actors are “the” social movement and an active citizenry. Instead of presenting globalization as the result of a macro-structural process bringing about the hegemony of a transnational bourgeoisie or of insisting on the class background of the alleged victims of globalization, issues are framed in terms of citizenship, democracy, solidarity, global markets, financial institutions, and corporations. This shift reflects the Politics against Global Markets frame. ATTAC praises civic engagement and claims to be defending not sector or class interests but the common good and society as a whole against market colonization understood as a process of commodification.

In this sense, ATTAC’s analysis—stressing the dissolution of social bonds and solidarities and the risk of a disintegration of society and reactionary backlash—is reminiscent of that of Karl Polanyi, and several leaders of ATTAC regularly invoke his work. For example, Susan George, vice president of ATTAC, writes,

A phenomenon that was born in the 18th century has just reached a point that is totally unbearable for most societies, namely that it is the economy that dictates its rules to society rather than the other way around. We are in the situation described by Karl Polanyi in his remarkable essay *The Great Transformation*.⁸⁴

Furthermore, in contrast to liberals, Bernard Cassen and other leaders of ATTAC categorically reject the *doux-commerce* thesis according to which trade is a powerful moralizing and civilizing agent.⁸⁵ Many of their arguments come close to what Albert Hirschman has called the self-destruction thesis, according to which “capitalist society . . . exhibits a pronounced proclivity to undermining the moral foundation on which any society, including its own, must rest.”⁸⁶ It follows that, and this is consistent with Polanyi, social and state regulation is necessary not only to defend society but also to protect capitalism from itself.

However, the fact that ATTAC’s analysis of globalization resembles Polanyi’s analysis of nineteenth-century capitalism does not entail that Polanyi’s countermovement theory is appropriate to explain the emergence of ATTAC and

the opposition to globalization. Put differently, it is not because some opponents of globalization claim that their actions embody the self-protection of society against the expansion of market forces that their actions are explainable in these terms. For opponents of globalization, Polanyi's work is appealing partly because it provides an anthropological, non-Marxist critique of the market economy that legitimates crosscutting alliances and state interventionism.

Prognosis

Globalization is essentially a political product, so the solution also lies in politics:

To challenge the domination of finance in a world where everything progressively becomes a commodity, where everything is sold and bought, is to challenge the organization of economic, human, social, and political relations; it is finally to place oneself in an eminently political field with the will to transform the world by means of democratic and civic mobilizations.⁸⁷

Thus, ATTAC may be critical of political parties but does not reject politics as such:

At a time when politics and parties suffer from a deep discredit, nourished by renouncements and fed by certain shameful behaviors, it is advisable not to confuse the object itself with the crisis affecting it, and to know how to oppose civic engagement to politicking practices.⁸⁸

ATTAC intends to participate in the public debate by calling out to citizens and playing a role as a "democratic stimulus." It officially defines its political identity as a movement of popular education based on four principles: *Laïcité*, independence vis-à-vis any form of instrumentalization, plurality as a guarantee against manipulation, and action.⁸⁹ Considering the diversity of organizations and political currents represented within ATTAC, trying to lay out more specific principles would probably bring about major tensions.

ATTAC's celebration of grassroots, civic politics comes hand in hand with macro demands. Its propositions to tame the forces of globalization and solve some of the problems associated with it refer primarily to the creation and enforcement of regulations through state intervention and supranational coordination. Although some of its demands are defensive—for instance, a moratorium on privatizations and genetically modified organisms and a mythification of public services—others are more innovative and transcend the nation-state. This is the case of the regulation of tax havens and capital mobility.

According to ATTAC, by providing fiscal advantages and insuring banking secrets and legal immunity, tax havens play a key role in the globalization of financial criminal activities. To check this criminality, ATTAC invokes the necessity of

an international penal court of humanity, such as the Hague international tribunal, that would be endowed with a supranational jurisdiction addressing economic criminality. In addition and for the time being, ATTAC demands the following: the gathering and diffusion of information on financial crimes; the publication of data on tax havens; that tax havens cooperate with the rest of the international community at the judiciary, administrative, and police levels; sanctions against financial establishments that refuse to cooperate; and the enforcement of existing laws against money laundering regardless of territoriality.⁹⁰

Similarly, ATTAC demands the creation of a tax, the Tobin Tax, on capital mobility so as to reduce speculation in the foreign exchange market and promote a total revision of the international financial system. ATTAC sees this tax as the first step toward a transformation of the world economy:

Even fixed at the particularly low rate of 0.05%, the Tobin Tax would yield nearly US\$100 billions per year. Collected essentially by industrialized countries, where the leading financial markets are located, this sum could then be given to international organizations to fight against inequality, promote education and public health in poor countries, and foster food safety and sustainable development.⁹¹

Although such a tax would have to be implemented by all G8 countries to be efficient, ATTAC claims that the main obstacle is political rather than technical: “What is actually missing [in the French government], is the will to defend a proposition that could hamper certain states and financial interests.”⁹² However, ATTAC does not have a specific plan to implement the tax. Its main goal is to trigger an international debate around five questions: What transactions should be taxed and what should be the level of the tax? How should the tax be collected? How should the tax be implemented? Who should manage the tax and how? How should the product of the tax be used?⁹³

Finally, ATTAC’s prognosis also aims at a comprehensive reform of international institutions such as the WTO. For example, ATTAC demands, among other things, a moratorium on all negotiations taking place at the WTO, the suppression of articles threatening national public services and social, environmental, and public health norms, the subordination of the decisions of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body to international law in terms of human rights, labor conventions, and environmental agreements, the participation of civil society in the elaboration trade policies, the promotion of fair trade, and the interdiction of licensing living organism.⁹⁴

Characterizing Associational Statism

I call ATTAC’s programmatic discourse “associational statism” because it combines an antiliberal aversion to the market with a countervailing faith in grassroots democracy and state interventionism.⁹⁵ Although grassroots democracy and

state interventionism may seem contradictory, from ATTAC's perspective they fulfill complementary functions, as the former addresses the democratic deficit while the latter tames global markets. State interventionism is actually seen as the precondition for grassroots democracy, for according to ATTAC's president Bernard Cassen, only the state can ensure the embeddedness of financial actors and conglomerates and thereby guarantee the two touchstones of democracy: responsibility and accountability.⁹⁶ Without state interventionism, participatory democracy would be an illusion.

Associational statism is difficult to classify. The best way to grasp its peculiarities is to contrast it to three other competing—but closely intertwined—discourses in the French political field: statism (in its Gaullist and Jacobin versions), associational socialism (first New Left, 1960s and 1970s), and associational liberalism (second New Left, 1980s and 1990s).⁹⁷ These discourses put forward different diagnoses and prognoses and identify distinct key agents (see Table 2). Statism cuts across the political spectrum and, although it took a more specific form after World War II, its roots go far back in French history, to Jean-Baptiste Colbert in the seventeenth century and the Jacobinism of the French Revolution.⁹⁸ It implies a strong belief in the state's capacity to supervise and shape the socio-economic and industrial development of the country. This belief was deeply challenged in 1982 and 1983, when Mitterrand's "experiment" collapsed, and has lost even more of its supporters since the idea that globalization undermines the authority and power of the state became widespread. Although statism remains an important feature of the French political culture, it is today primarily defended by neorepublicans such as former socialist and minister of interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

Associational socialism, as Jonah Levy calls it,⁹⁹ emerged in the wake of the events of May 1968 and aspired to a break with capitalism. The idea of economic democracy in the form of workers' self-management (*autogestion*) and a confidence in the capacities of civil society rather than the state were at the core of this desired rupture. The union CFDT and sectors of the PS gathered around Michel Rocard were until the late 1970s the main champions of this current. As the possibility of a break with capitalism vanished, associational socialism mutated into associational liberalism, which celebrated the "German model" and found its clearest expression in Michel Rocard's government (1988-91). Associational liberalism aimed at a withdrawal of the state that would be compensated by an increased participation of local and societal actors (small and medium enterprises, local government) in the management of their economic affairs. Such a program implied a higher flexibility of the labor market. According to Chris Howell, the ease with which the PS shifted from socialism to liberalism and adopted flexibility can be partly explained by

Table 2
Associational Statism in Comparative Perspective

| Discourse | Associational Socialism | Associational Liberalism | Associational Statism | Statism |
|-----------|---|---|--|---|
| Diagnosis | Capitalism, excessive statism, democratic deficit | Excessive statism, lack of opportunities for local economic actors, democratic deficit | Globalization, state retrenchment, democratic deficit, commodification | Globalization, domination of interest groups at the expense of the general interest |
| Prognosis | Break from capitalism, state reform (decentralization), worker self-management (autogestion), vigorous associational life | State reform (decentralization, privatizations, liberalization), coordination of societal and local groups, vigorous associational life | State intervention (moratorium on privatizations, protectionism for culture and services), state reform (decentralization), vigorous associational life and participatory politics, supranational regulation | State intervention and <i>dirigisme</i> (nationalizations, plannification, protectionism) |
| Foes | Capitalists, state bureaucracy and elite | State bureaucracy, corporatism, <i>dirigisme</i> | Financial institutions, transnational corporations, neoliberals, elites | Liberals, rootless entrepreneurs, foreign corporations |
| Friends | Civil society (civic associations, unions), workers | Civil society (small- and medium-sized enterprises, local institutions, civic associations) | Civil society (civic associations, social movements, unions), state | State bureaucracy and elite, national champions |

the area of compatibility that existed between autogestion, once shorn of its radical, socialist elements, and flexibility. Both were antagonistic toward state *dirigisme* . . . both focused their attention on the firm. . . . Statism was more seen as the problem than the solution.¹⁰⁰

However, political factors and the weakness of societal actors prevented associational liberalism from succeeding. The result was a renewed pressure for state intervention.¹⁰¹

Although associational statism is closely related to these three discourses, it departs from them in its emphasis on non-*dirigiste* state interventionism and an autonomous and active civil society. For example, the strong national and supra-national forms of regulation that it demands would be shaped by participatory politics at the same time that they would make such a politics possible and effective. It thus suggests that state-society relations can be a synergy rather than a zero-sum game (i.e., more state equals less society and vice versa).

Therefore, associational statism lies not only at the crossroads of several national ideological traditions from which it draws, accentuates, and reinterprets certain elements, thereby producing a hybrid discourse. It also escapes the Old Left/New Left divide. On one hand, it fits in many respects the New Left: it is suspicious of traditional political parties, bureaucracy, and technocrats; questions the idea of progress; denounces the alienation and dehumanizing consequences of the modern economy; and, above all, emphasizes the role of autonomous civic associations and participatory politics.¹⁰² But on the other hand, it focuses on economic and redistributive issues and believes that renewed state intervention is at the core of any solution to current problems. In this sense, it shares some features of the Old Left.¹⁰³ This synthesis is materialized by the participation of both unions and postmaterialist organizations within ATTAC.

Similarly, associational statism blends conservatism with reformism. On one hand, the defense of the welfare state and the fear of the commodification of living organisms can represent a nostalgic movement in favor of the status quo as Marcel Gauchet and Pierre Rosanvallon have argued.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the insistence on participatory politics, innovative demands such as the Tobin Tax, and increasing cross-border networking suggest that associational statism diverges from the traditional French statist ideology. Its stance in favor of social and political change is illustrated by its enthusiastic support of deliberative grassroots democracy and participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, associational statism does not imply “a nostalgia for a disappearing way of life—one when France was a cultural and political leader in the world.”¹⁰⁶ Even though it invokes the citizenry against political elites and technocrats, it is neither a populist call to bypass representative institutions nor an antisystemic invitation to break away from liberal democracy and capitalism. This respect of institutions is confirmed by ATTAC’s strategy. The latter is contentious but does not rule out the possibility of cooperating with institutional actors insofar as these are willing to advance its claims. Its discourse and practices are not antisystemic,

for they presuppose that the political system can accommodate heterogeneous and conflicting interests.¹⁰⁷ This “realignment” strategy takes advantage of “the decreasing capacity of traditional alignments to support collective identities and structure political action” and “emphasizes the need to restructure political systems on the basis of new collective identities, without entailing a global delegitimation of the established members and procedures of the polity.”¹⁰⁸ Such a moderate stance probably makes ATTAC more appealing in a context in which the idea of an antisystemic rupture has lost most of its legitimacy.

Other French opponents of globalization do, however, hold a more antisystemic stance. For example, some sectors of the Coordination for a Civic Control of the WTO, which emerged out the mobilization against the MAI and is led by the association *Droits devant!* and the Observatory of Globalization, two organizations that are members of ATTAC, hold a more anticapitalist stance and believe that the Tobin Tax is inadequate.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, on 20 January 2000, French Trotskyist deputies of the LCR and Workers’ Struggle (*Lutte ouvrière*) at the European Parliament refused, on grounds that capitalism is not reformable, to support a resolution that would have led the European Commission to submit a report about the feasibility and implementation of the Tobin Tax. The resolution was supported by 225 deputies out of 400 but fell short of four votes to reach the necessary majority.¹¹⁰

THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING MAINLY LOCALLY

To mobilize potential participants and increase its influence, ATTAC focuses on three routes: popular education, networking, and targeting the state. One of the main routes to mobilization against globalization is the forging of an understanding of the relationship between individuals’ grievances and changes in the international economy. Hence, ATTAC’s emphasis on “popular education.” In addition to the information it spreads over the Internet, it publishes a newsletter and very affordable introductory books that discuss the consequences of globalization in an accessible, jargon-free style, while many local committees regularly organize conferences and workshops. This effort aims at unmasking the “newspeak” of neoliberalism.¹¹¹ As ATTAC’s 2002 Manifesto explains, “We wish to work so that the minds, conditioned by close to a quarter of a century of liberal brainwashing, resume to function freely again. For it is indeed ideas that change the world.”¹¹²

Interorganizational networking is at the core of ATTAC’s strategy at the national and increasingly transnational level. As I pointed out earlier, multiple affiliations and a decentralized structure play a key role at the national level. At the transnational level, the construction of networks is related to the growing importance of international institutions, such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations, “which serve as sources of group claims, as targets for their protests, and as sites that can bring parallel groups together internationally.”¹¹³ The regular meetings organized by these international institutions provide oppor-

tunities for transnational contacts; consolidation and expansion of networks; diffusion of ideas, frames, and forms of collective action; and coordination for future events.¹¹⁴ The same dynamic applies at the European level, where ATTAC tries to increase the number of meetings with other antiglobalization groups, particularly its own sister organizations. The now-annual World Social Forum, held in Porto Alegre in late January as a response to the World Economic Forum, represents perhaps the ultimate meeting ground for these diffusion and constitutive processes.

However, we should be careful not to celebrate the emergence of a global civil society too quickly. First, mobilization processes still depend primarily on national social networks. Thus, Lichbach and Almeida estimate that during the Seattle protests against the WTO in December 1999, out of a total of 39,000 to 53,000 participants, 20,000 to 25,000 came from Seattle and Washington State, 15,000 to 20,000 from the greater United States, 3,000 to 5,000 from Canada, and only 1,000 to 3,000 from outside Canada and the United States (that is, between 2.5 and 5.7 percent of the total number of participants).¹¹⁵ Moreover, governments can still prevent antiglobalization protests by sealing borders, and they increasingly do so.¹¹⁶

Second, the transnational networks described above serve limited objectives and do not imply a systematic mutual support. Rather than constituting the backbone of a transnational social movement, they fit what Tarrow calls “transnational political exchange,” that is, a temporary form of cooperation across boundaries involving national actors that have ideological affinities and something to gain from the exchange but whose existence is independent of it.¹¹⁷ Therefore, the driving force can still be domestic issues, and international events are then simply a way to acquire additional symbolic resources. Moreover, the meaning and stakes of transnational mobilizations are generally conditioned by previous national contentious episodes, such as the 1995 strikes in France.

Finally, in the same way that the nationalization of politics entailed a shift from the local to the national, one could have expected the globalization of politics to entail a shift from the national to the supranational. This is what seems to be emerging with the progressive reframing of local grievances in global terms. However, beyond discourse, the main target of collective action remains the nation-state—even in regions as integrated as the European Union—because this is against whom organizations of civil society have the highest leverage.¹¹⁸ Even when challengers put forward claims against nonstate actors, they generally do it through the mediation of the nation-state.

CONCLUSION

The emergence, form, and discourse of ATTAC could not have been explained by tracing the impact of globalization. As I have shown, political entrepreneurs, whose understanding of globalization and organizational strategies had been con-

ditioned by previous waves of mobilization and contentious episodes, were instrumental in creating ATTAC. More precisely, the Politics against Global Markets frame that came out of the December 1995 strikes shaped the way these entrepreneurs would interpret the Asian financial crisis and the mobilization against the MAI, define their own endeavor, and look for allies. Similarly, even though they had not foreseen the importance that local committees would take, they relied on the repertoire of collective action that the social movements of the late 1980s and 1990s had modeled and formed a civic association at the margins of the party system and major labor confederations but at the crossroads of dense interorganizational networks. Therefore, the case of ATTAC suggests that the opposition to globalization could be a contingent phenomenon that varies within and across countries not according to the extent to which social groups or countries are affected by globalization but according to political and cultural dynamics as well as institutional factors.

The multiplication of ATTAC organizations and antiglobalization protests throughout the world does not necessarily mean that a generic trend is at work (i.e., economic integration generates resistance). Diffusion processes of ideas, frames, and tactics during international meetings and countersummits and through mechanisms of identification and emulation could lead to an increased resistance regardless of long-term structural changes.¹¹⁹ Moreover, although most opponents of globalization around the world share some basic strategic, organizational, and ideational features—they take advantage of opportunities deriving from the crisis of representativity of traditional organizations, rely on horizontal, decentralized networks and participatory politics, downplay or ignore class references, invoke a self-protection argument à la Polanyi—the axis around which political struggles crystallize varies across countries. This axis stems in great part from national institutional configurations and state-society relations and has a significant impact on the meaning and stakes of subsequent contentious episodes. In France, contention crystallized around public services and the role of the republican state rather than, for example, international trade issues. Focusing on these axes of crystallization opens a potentially fruitful path to research the politics of globalization by linking the study of contention to debates about the varieties of capitalism in comparative political economy.¹²⁰

NOTES

1. Suzanne Berger, "Globalization and Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 44.

2. B. Crossette, "Making Room for the Poor in a Global Economy," *New York Times*, 16 April 2000.

3. For arguments about a cultural backlash, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); and Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier, "Globalization and French Cultural Identity," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 19, no. 1 (2001): 22-41.

4. For examples of the application of neoclassical trade models, see Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Jeffrey A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45, no. 4 (1991): 425-51. For the countermovement hypothesis, the classic reference is Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart, 1944; reprint, Boston: Beacon, 1957). For authors that explicitly or implicitly endorse Polanyi's theory, see, among others, Ethan B. Kapstein, "Workers and the World Economy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (May/June 1996): 16-37; Manuel Castells, *The Information Age, Vol. 2: The Power of Identity* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1997); and Dani Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997).

5. Mark I. Lichbach and Paul Almeida, "Global Order and Local Resistance: The Neoliberal Institutional Trilemma and the Battle of Seattle" (Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, February 2002), 11.

6. For a discussion, see Sidney Tarrow, "From Lumping to Splitting: Inside 'Globalization' and 'Resistance,'" in *Globalization and Resistance*, ed. J. Smith and H. Johnston (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).

7. *Ibid.*, 9. On the importance of studying the causes of collective action rather than assuming the impact of globalization on that action, see Deborah J. Yashar, "Globalization and Collective Action: A Review Essay," *Comparative Politics* (forthcoming).

8. See Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Sidney Tarrow, "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 1-20.

9. See Doug McAdam and William H. Sewell Jr., "It's about Time: Temporality in the Study of Social Movements and Revolutions," in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. R. R. Aminzade et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 118-19.

10. Many opponents of globalization dislike the label "antiglobalization" and point out that they are not against globalization as such but against neoliberal or corporate globalization. They stress that this distinguishes them from nationalists. Nonetheless, in this article I will use the term "antiglobalization" because these groups are opposed to globalization *as it is taking place today*, although they may also support other, alternative forms of globalization.

11. Sondages CSA, "Les Français et la taxe Tobin," retrieved 17 September 2001 from <http://www.csa-tmo.fr/fra/dataset/data2001/opi20010912b.htm>. The Tobin Tax refers to a tax on capital mobility that was proposed by the late Yale professor and Nobel laureate of economics James Tobin in the 1970s. Although he proposed this tax, Tobin was a Keynesian liberal in favor of free trade. Interestingly enough, those most opposed to the Tobin Tax in France are at the far-Right of the political spectrum, indicating that nationalist opponents of globalization hold different sets of demands.

12. Quoted in Elie Cohen, *La Tentation hexagonale: La souveraineté à l'épreuve de la mondialisation* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 117.

13. See Jill Lovecy, "The End of French Exceptionalism?" *West European Politics* 22, no. 4 (October 1999): 205-24.

14. A. Beuve-Mery and C. Monnot, "L'OMC devient la cible du combat contre la mondialisation financière," *Le Monde*, 26 October 1999.

15. Sofres, "Les références idéologiques des Français," retrieved July 2000 from http://www.sofres.fr/etudes/pol/130700_references_r.htm.

16. Sofres, "Les Français et la régulation du capitalisme à l'heure de la mondialisation," retrieved July 2000 from http://www.sofres.fr/etudes/pol/070700_regulation_n.htm.

17. Eddy Fougier, "Perceptions de la mondialisation en France et aux Etats-Unis," *Politique étrangère* no. 3 (July-September 2001): 569-85.

18. By "social movement," I mean "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities." Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.

19. Although political parties are different from social movement organizations, they can nonetheless be related to them through informal networks and participate in protest events, thereby blurring the line between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics.

20. Berger, "Globalization and Politics," 58. See also Suzanne Berger, "French Democracy without Borders?" *French Politics, Culture & Society* (forthcoming).

21. Sophie Meunier, "France, Globalization and Global Protectionism," Center for European Studies, Harvard University, working paper Series 71, February 2000, 3. However, traditional protectionism is not about to disappear, as President Bush's recent decision to increase tariffs to protect the American steel industry indicates.

22. McAdam and Sewell, "It's about Time," 119.

23. Meunier, "France, Globalization and Global Protectionism," 5-6. It should nonetheless be noted that European integration also entails a high level of political integration and thereby opens new paths for regulation.

24. Juppé's reform was related to financial requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and to the establishment of the Euro and directly contradicted the promises made by Chirac a few months earlier during the presidential campaign.

25. Several people talked of strike by proxy (*grève par procuration*), and the number of people participating in marches (around two million) exceeded by far the number of workers actually on strike (seven hundred thousand). Sophie Bérout, René Mouriaux, and Michel Vakaloulis, *Le Mouvement social en France: Essai de sociologie politique* (Paris: La Dispute, 1998), 115.

26. David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464-81; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movements across Cultures*, ed. B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1988). In spite of its usefulness, the concept of frame suffers from some limitations and is not always clearly distinguished from related concepts such as ideology and discourse. See Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (November 1997): 409-30; Marc W. Steinberg, "Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn," *Theory and Society* 27, no. 6 (December 1998): 845-72; Daniel Cefaï and Danny Trom, eds., *Les Formes de l'action collective: Mobilisations dans des arènes publiques* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2001).

27. Some authors associate this civilization with the welfare state. For example, in a speech he delivered at the Gare de Lyon in Paris during the 1995 strikes, Pierre Bourdieu stated,

I am here to express our support for those who have been fighting for three weeks against the destruction of a *civilization*, associated with the existence of the public service, the Republican equality of rights, rights to education, health, culture, research, arts, and, above all, work.

Bourdieu, *Contre-feux: Propos pour servir à la résistance contre l'invasion néo-libérale* (Paris: Liber-Raisons d'agir, 1998), 30. All translations from the French are mine.

28. Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 3 (November 1992): 576.

29. For a discussion of French antiliberalism, see Thierry Leterre, *La Gauche et la peur libérale* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000).

30. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 122.

31. For an in-depth analysis—although biased in favor of the strikes—of the role of intellectuals during the 1995 strikes, see Julien Duval et al., *Le "décembre" des intellectuels français* (Paris: Liber-Raisons d'agir, 1998).

32. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A. D. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 138.

33. The defense of the "public service," which was at the heart of the 1995 strikes and is one of the main—if not *the* main—symbols invoked by French opponents of globalization, is a powerful reference that cuts across the political spectrum. For example, right before the 1995 strikes, Rally for the Republic leader Philippe Séguin declared in a parliamentary report that

the public service is an integral part of French culture. The values that are related to it, such as the solidarity among the French and the different parts of the territory, are at the basis of the social cohesion of our country and of its founding "Republican pact."

Frank Borotra, *Faut-il défendre le service public?*, Rapport d'information no. 2260 (National Assembly, 6 October 1995), quoted in Cohen, *La Tentation hexagonale*, 180. See also Alistair Cole, "The Service Public under Stress," *West European Politics* 22, no. 4 (October 1999): 166-84.

34. In France, it is the opposite claim, namely, that the role of the state should be limited, that sparks controversies and requires a special justification. Except for Démocratie libérale, a small party led by Alain Madelin, not a single French political party dares to openly defend a liberal, promarket and free-trade agenda. Thus, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin triggered a strong public debate when he declared after the Michelin layoffs in 1999 that he would not intervene in this affair and that people should not expect the state to do everything. However, the pressure was strong enough to lead the Socialist Party to propose a law of "social modernization" to tighten the regulation of layoffs.

35. "Frame bridging" refers to "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem." Snow et al. "Frame Alignment Processes," 467.

36. For a discussion of the corporatist dimension of the opposition to globalization in France, see Jacques Capdevielle, *Modernité du corporatisme* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000).

37. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, *Le Nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 742, n. 8.

38. See Stephen J. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Policy* 112 (fall 1998): 97-109.

39. In contrast to the December 1995 strikes, which had been a purely domestic event, this time the mobilization benefited from transnational networks composed of American and Canadian nongovernmental organizations and unions—including among many others, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, Oxfam, Sierra Club, Amnesty International, Third World Network, the AFL-CIO, and United Steelworkers of America—that had been active in the campaign against the North American Free Trade Agreement and that quickly spread the content of the MAI over the Internet. See Kobrin, "The MAI;" C. de Brie, "Vers une mondialisation de la résistance: Comment l'AMI fut mis en pièces," *Le Monde diplomatique*, December 1998; and Observatoire de la mondialisation, *Lumière sur l'AMI: Le test de Dracula* (Paris: L'Esprit frappeur, 1998).

40. Quoted in Observatoire de la mondialisation, *Lumière sur l'AMI*, 54.

41. Coordination contre l'AMI, "Le Manifeste du 28 Avril 1998," retrieved from <http://attac.org>.

42. Etats Généraux pour le contrôle citoyen de l'OMC, "Appel pour le contrôle citoyen de l'OMC: L'internationale du capital triomphe, celle des êtres humains aspire à naître," retrieved from <http://www.etats-generaux.ras.eu.org>.

43. Doug McAdam, "'Initiator' and 'Spin-off' Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles," in *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, ed. M. Traugott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

44. The most prominent associations were Droit au logement (DAL, demanding housing rights), Agir ensemble contre le chômage! (AC!, fighting unemployment), and Droits devant! (DD!, demanding social rights in general). For surveys of these groups, see Cécile Péchu, "Quand les 'exclus' passent à l'action: La mobilisation des mal-logés," *Politix* no. 34 (1996): 114-33; Frédéric Royall, "Protestations collectives d'une minorité socio-économique en France," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 18, no. 2 (summer 2000): 69-85; Isabelle Sommier, *Les Nouveaux mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation* (Paris: Flammarion, 2001).

45. For example, they went from "housing as a workers' right" in the late 1980s to "housing as an individual right" in the early 1990s and finally to "social rights against exclusion" in the mid-1990s; see Péchu, "Quand les 'exclus' passent."

46. On the idea of "new" citizenship and forms of participation, see Sarah Waters, "New Social Movement Politics in France: The Rise of Civic Forms of Mobilisation," *West European Politics* 21, no. 3 (July 1998): 170-86; Martine Barthélemy, *Associations: Un nouvel âge de la participation?* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000).

47. Patrick Hassenteufel, "Pratiques représentatives et construction identitaire: Une approche des coordinations," *Revue française de science politique* 41, no. 1 (February 1991): 5-27.

48. Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1986), 4.

49. Interview with author, 13 March 2002.

50. However, spin-off organizations do not simply adopt existing ideas. As Doug McAdam points out, they are "creative adapters and interpreters." McAdam, "'Initiator' and 'Spin-off' Movements," 229. On multiorganizational fields, see Bert Klandermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1997), chap. 6.

51. I. Ramonet, "Désarmer les marchés," *Le Monde diplomatique*, December 1997.

52. Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), *Tout sur Attac* (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2000), 11.

53. The expression “collective evils” is from J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 536.

54. Snow et al. define a “sentiment pool” as an aggregate “of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and for acting in pursuit of their interests.” Snow et al. “Frame Alignment Processes,” 467.

55. Lichbach and Almeida, “Global Order and Local Resistance,” 29.

56. Interview with author, 7 March 2002.

57. ATTAC, “Etat des lieux,” December 2001. Legal entities such as unions and civic associations count as one member.

58. Interview with author, 5 December 2000. See also N. Weill, “Ni norme anglo-saxonne ni modèle américain de contestation,” *Le Monde*, 4 June 2000. According to Sylvie Derrien, former coordinator of local committees for ATTAC, about a third of the members are active, in the sense that they regularly attend and participate in events. Interview with author, 5 December 2000.

59. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 114-15.

60. Similarly, several American commentators have stressed the low participation of minorities during the anti-World Trade Organization protests in Seattle.

61. It should be noted that in January 2000, ATTAC officially took position in favor of the right to vote of foreigners living in France. See “L’Appel de Morsang,” in ATTAC, *Agir local, penser global* (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2001), 78.

62. Hanspeter Kriesi et al., *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 14-21. According to Kriesi et al., new social movements emerged in the 1970s and essentially put forward postmaterialist demands (peace, environment, recognition of cultural diversity, minority rights, etc.), as opposed to the redistributive demands of “old” social movements.

63. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999), 120-23.

64. On brokerage as a mechanism shaping the dynamics of contention, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

65. Although the socialist government of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has officially rejected the idea of a Tobin Tax (the minister of finance, Laurent Fabius, said it was impossible to implement it for technical reasons), the ATTAC coordination at the National Assembly is dominated by socialists and the coordination at the European parliament is led by a socialist deputy.

66. However, the fact that the Left had won these elections was not necessarily seen as an opportunity by the founders of ATTAC, who depicted their initiative as an alternative to institutional, mainstream politics.

67. ATTAC, “Compte de résultat” (1998, 1999, 2000).

68. Interview with ATTAC’s Web master, Laurent Jesover, 8 March 2002. For a discussion of the role of Internet inside ATTAC, see Flore Trautmann, “Internet au service de la démocratie? Le cas d’ATTAC,” *Cahiers du Cevipof* no. 30, Institute of Political Studies, Paris, 2001.

69. This assessment is based on several months of participant observation in local committees, meetings, and assemblies of ATTAC.

70. Sofres, “Les Français, la politique et la représentation,” retrieved September 2000 from http://www.sofres.fr/etudes/pol/130900_ideo_n.htm.

71. Elisabeth Clemens, *The People's Lobby* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 50, quoted in Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 293.

72. I call them sister organizations rather than branches because they are completely autonomous and do not receive any funding from ATTAC France.

73. Interview with author, 5 December 2000. ATTAC's Web site (<http://attac.org>) offers information in four languages, and some of its documents are translated in thirteen languages. According to its Web master, Laurent Jesover, ATTAC's Web site gets around 4,000,000 connections from 130 countries per month, about 39,000 documents are downloaded every day, and more than 80,000 people are subscribed to ATTAC's weekly e-mail newsletter. Interview with author, 8 March 2002.

74. I am thus suggesting that the Politics against Global Markets frame has become similar to what Snow and Benford call a "master frame." According to them,

Master frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories. . . . So conceived, master frames can be construed as functioning in a manner analogous to linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world.

Snow and Benford, "Master Frames," 138. For a discussion of the effect of institutionalized ideas, see also Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

75. Luc Boltanski, *La Souffrance à distance: Morale humanitaire, médias et politique* (Paris: Editions Métailié, 1993), 97.

76. *Ibid.*, 98.

77. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 16.

78. For a recent critique of the "race-to-the-bottom myth," see Daniel Drezner, "Bottom Feeders," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2000): 64-70. See also Elie Cohen's discussion of the reception of the Arthuis Report on "delocalizations" in *La Tentation hexagonale*, 123-32; Suzanne Berger, "Trade and Identity: The Coming Protectionism?" in *Remaking the Hexagone: The New France in the New Europe*, ed. G. Flynn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

79. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 30.

80. Bernard Cassen, "Contre la prolifération du commerce international: Inventer ensemble un 'protectionnisme altruiste'," *Le Monde diplomatique*, February 2000.

81. Bernard Cassen, "To Save Society" (paper presented at the conference "Is Globalisation Inevitable and Desirable?" at the London School of Economics, 7 May 1997).

82. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 88.

83. *Ibid.*, 96.

84. Susan George, in S. George and M. Wolf, *La Mondialisation libérale* (Paris: Grasset/Les Echos, 2002), 25.

85. Bernard Cassen, "Contre la prolifération."

86. Albert O. Hirschman, ed., "Rival Views of Market Society," in *Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 110.

87. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 22.

88. *Ibid.*, 25.

89. *Ibid.*, 24-25.

90. ATTAC, *Les Paradis fiscaux ou la finance sans lois* (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2000), 39-40, 43-44.

91. ATTAC, *Tout sur Attac*, 18.

92. *Ibid.*, 70.

93. *Ibid.*, 54-58.

94. ATTAC, *Remettre l'OMC à sa place* (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2001), 93-98.

95. My definition is a paraphrase of Jonah Levy's definition of associational liberalism. As defined by Levy, associational liberalism "combines a liberal aversion to the *dirigiste* state with a countervailing faith in the coordinating capacities of societal and local associations." Joseph Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Economy, and Society in Contemporary France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8.

96. Cassen, "To Save Society."

97. This categorization is inspired by Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge*, 79.

98. For a discussion of statism in the twentieth century, see Richard F. Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

99. Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge*, 79.

100. Chris Howell, "The Dilemmas of Post-Fordism: Socialists, Flexibility, and Labor Market Deregulation in France," *Politics & Society* 20, no. 1 (March 1992): 81-82.

101. Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge*.

102. On the New Left, see Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies," *Daedalus* 108, no. 1 (winter 1979): 27-50; Claus Offe, "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements since the 1960s," in *Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe*, ed. C. S. Maier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Russel J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, eds., *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1990); Herbert Kitschelt, "Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (July 1993): 13-29.

103. For an overview of the evolution of the French Left during the 1970s and the 1980s, see George Ross, "The Changing Face of Popular Power in France," in *Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies*, ed. F. Fox Piven (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

104. Marcel Gauchet, "1995: Les voies secrètes de la société libérale," *Le Débat* no. 111 (September/October 2000): 121-36; Pierre Rosanvallon, "L'Esprit de 1995," *Le Débat* no. 111 (September/October 2000): 118-20.

105. ATTAC is also one of the main organizers, together with the Brazilian Workers' Party, of the annual World Social Forum that met in Porto Alegre in 2001 and 2002.

106. Gordon and Meunier, "Globalization and French Cultural Identity," 37. Gordon and Meunier were not talking about ATTAC or associational statism but about the French reaction against globalization in general.

107. See della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 80.

108. *Ibid.*, 81.

109. C. Monnot, "Divergences au sein de la 'nébuleuse' anti-OMC," *Le Monde*, 26 October 1999.

110. Glyn Ford and Harlem Désir, "Near Victory in the European Parliament," Tobin Tax Initiative, Center for Environmental Economic Development, retrieved from <http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/euronear.htm>.

111. Bernard Cassen, "Pour la reconquête du sens des mots," in ATTAC, ed., *Contre la dictature des marchés* (Paris: La Dispute/Syllepse/VO Editions, 1999), 141. "Newspeak"

(*novlang* in French) refers to the new language invented by Big Brother in George Orwell's 1984.

112. ATTAC, "Avec ATTAC se réapproprié l'avenir," *2002 Manifesto* (Paris: ATTAC, 2002), 1.

113. Sidney Tarrow, "Contentious Politics in a Composite Polity," in *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*, ed. D. Imig and S. Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 247.

114. Interview with Christophe Ventura, international office secretary of ATTAC, 5 December 2000.

115. Lichbach and Almeida, "Global Order and Local Resistance," 43.

116. In early December 2000, the prefecture of Alpes-Maritimes, in southeast France, sealed the border with Italy to prevent Italian activists from participating in the protest against the European Union (EU) summit in Nice. A similar dynamic took place in January 2001 during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, at the Canadian border in April 2001 during the Quebec summit, at the Italian border in July 2001 during the Genoa G8 summit, and at the Spanish border in March 2002 during the Barcelona EU summit. This increasingly common practice is accompanied by a criminalization of antiglobalization protests, as a growing number of protesters are arrested and intelligence about organizations is centralized in European agencies. For example, the EU council of ministers has been discussing the possibility of extending the Schengen information system based in Strasbourg, France, so as to include a list of individuals known for having caused a "public order disturbance" or likely to organize and participate in events "threatening public order or security" and prevent them from travelling within Europe. Although the plan would officially aim at violent demonstrators, hooligans, and terrorists, and not at peaceful and lawful protesters, it has raised the concern of nongovernmental organizations monitoring civil liberties. A. Travis and I. Black, "Violent Protesters Face EU Travel Ban," *The Guardian*, 4 December 2001.

117. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 187.

118. Sidney Tarrow, "The Europeanisation of Conflict: Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective," *West European Politics* 18, no. 2 (April 1995): 223-51; Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow, "Political Contention in a Europeanising Polity," *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (October 2000): 73-93.

119. On diffusion processes, see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 334-35.

120. On globalization and varieties of capitalism, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).